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THE FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT: METRO-GOLD WYN-MA YER
STUDIOS, INC. V. GROKSTER, LTD.
DANA R. LEVIN*
INTRODUCTION
The developing trend of peer-to-peerl file sharing on the
Internet, as well as the ensuing flood of copyright infringement
lawsuits, 2  has given the courts cause to re-examine the
established law of copyright infringement and assess the
applicability of such law to modern Internet innovations. In light
of the fast-paced growth of Internet technologies that have made
the illegal distribution of copyrighted works as simple as the click
of a mouse, copyright owners are eager to have those facilitating
infringement of their copyrights found liable for copyright
infringement.3 The courts are faced with the daunting task of
determining which entity is liable, either the direct infringer or
* J.D. Candidate, St. John's University School of Law, June 2006; B.A. Psychology, cum
laude, Boston University, May 2002. Special thanks to the 2005-2006 editors and staff of
St. John's Journal of Legal Commentary for their kind words and hard work. To the first
of many.
1 See Jesse M. Feder, Is Betamax Obsolete?: Sony Corp. of America v. Universal
Studios, Inc. in the Age of Napster, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 859, 862 (2004) (offering a
broad definition of "peer-to-peer" as "interactions between machines of equal status on the
network," including both "communications between servers, as well as file distribution
systems"); see also Tim Wu, When Code Isn't Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 717-19 (2003)
(describing elements of peer-to-peer file sharing).
2 See Feder, supra note 1, at 860 (noting flood of lawsuits has given courts several
opportunities to explore meaning of copyright holding in Sony). See generally David J.
Colletti, Jr., Note, Technology Under Siege: Peer-to-Peer Technology Is the Victim of the
Entertainment Industry's Misguided Attack, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 255, 255-56 (2003)
(noting wave of suits against infringers even after decisions against copyright owners).
3 See Colletti, supra note 2, at 255-56 (commenting on recent attack against peer-to-
peer file distribution on Internet); Recent Case, Copyright Law: Ninth Circuit Holds That
Computer File-Sharing Software Vendors Are Note Liable For Users' Copyright
Infringement: Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 118 HARV. L. REV.
1761, 1761-62 (2005) (noting that media goliaths are in technological arms race with
Internet software developers).
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the company that facilitated the means for the infringement, and
by which standard.4
Copyright owners are unlikely to sue those who directly trade
software, video, or music files over the Internet. 5 In fact,
allegations made against direct infringers are so rare that when
the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) filed suits
against infringers utilizing peer-to-peer networks, the legal
community was shocked.6 More often, the owners seek to have
those companies who facilitate such infringement held liable.7
From the position of the copyright owners, the suits are justified
because "the high volume of illegal uses, and the low return to
suing any one individual, make it more cost effective to aim
litigation at targets as far up the chain as possible."8 In short, it
is easier for the owners to sue companies like Napster who make
the software that can be used to share files, instead of the
millions of individuals who actually share files illegally with the
aid of the Napster software.
Suits brought against file sharing distribution companies are
frequently based on theories of secondary liability.9 Both the file
sharing software distributors and the copyright owners in the
music and movie industries are eager to know where the courts
4 See Feder, supra note 1, at 860-61 (commenting on how the flood of peer-to-peer
infringement has forced courts to struggle with applying Sony decision). See generally
Richard M. Myrick, Peer-To-Peer and Substantial Noninfringing Use: Giving the Term
"Substantial" Some Meaning, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 539, 539-40 (2005) (noting that
Ninth Circuit has made it extremely difficult to pursue contributory infringement claims).
5 See Kristina Groennings, Costs and Benefits of the Recording Industry's Litigation
Against Individuals, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 571, 573-74 (2005) (noting difficulties in
pursuit of direct infringers, most notably prohibition from using Digital Millenium
Copyright Act's subpoena power to compel internet service providers (ISP) to disclose
identities of individual users accused of direct infringement); Mark A. Lemley & R.
Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without Restricting Innovation,
56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1346 (2004) (commenting that suing actual infringers is becoming
pass6).
6 See Lemley, supra note 5, at 1346 (noting that actual infringement suits are based
on secondary liability); Myrick, supra note 4, at 539 (noting there was settlement largely
because of public outrage).
7 See Lemley, supra note 5, at 1346 (naming Napster, eBay, and Yahoo! Auction as
the normal targets of copyright holders as both direct facilitators and quasi-internet
service providers). See generally Myrick, supra note 4, at 539 (noting direct infringer
lawsuits are largely a result of the recent Ninth Circuit ruling against the industry).
8 See Lemley, supra note 5, at 1349 (commenting that it was easier and more effective
to shut down Napster than to sue each individual infringer).
9 See Lemley, supra note 5, at 1347 (adding that some recent suits involve tertiary
liability); Feder, supra note 1, at 868 (noting that courts impose secondary liability to
parties who are not direct infringers).
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will ultimately find liability for such infringement.' 0 It seems,
however, that while Internet technology continues to grow, the
law lags behind. Conflicting holdings have been produced in a
series of cases involving copyright infringement and the
Internet.1 Napster was the leading peer-to-peer file sharing
program facilitating millions of illegal downloads of copyrighted
music and, through several rounds of litigation, was forced to
evolve into a fee based file distributor providing only legal
downloads of music. 12 Yet, there are other companies that
continue to make available peer-to-peer file sharing software that
may be used to pirate copyrighted music and movies.13 In hopes
of resolving the dispute over Internet copyright infringement
liability, Part I of this Comment will provide a detailed analysis
of the seminal cases in this area of law. Part II will focus on the
Ninth Circuit decision in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd.14 and its recent review by the Supreme Court - a
10 See David Moser, Free to Share?: Grokster Decision Sidesteps Innovation/Copyright
Battle; Puts Focus on Business Strategies, 41 TENN. B.J. 14, 17 (2005) (arguing that
Supreme Court in its Grokster decision framed the conflict in terms of "company's actions
in marketing its technology" and could realign landscape and business strategies of file
sharing industry); see also Olga V. Kotlyarevskaya, BMG Canada, Inc. v. Doe & Society of
Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Ass'n of Internet
Providers: Why the Canadian Music Compensation System May Not Work in the United
States, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 953, 967-73 (2005) (discussing strengths and weaknesses
of the adoption of Canadian approach to copyright enforcement in digital context). See
generally Emily E. Larocque, No Free Music: Effect of A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.
on the Music Industry and Internet Copyright Law, 23 U. HAW. L. REV. 767, 792-93 (2001)
(noting future litigation will further refine Internet copyright law).
11 See Feder, supra note 1, at 860-61 (describing contradicting decisions between
Ninth Circuit and Seventh Circuits); Recent Case, supra note 3, at 1764 (noting difference
in the Seventh and Ninth Circuit decisions).
12 See Julie Hilden, File Sharing Goes Before Supreme Court, CNN.COM, Feb. 16, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/02/16/hilden.fileswap/ (stating that Napster has
transformed into a website that, for a monthly rate, allows only downloads of copyrighted
music for which a license has been granted); Kevin Michael Lemley, Comment Protecting
Consumers From Themselves: Alleviating the Market Inequalities Created by Online
Copyright Infringement in the Entertainment Industry, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 613, 625
(2003) (stating that by 2000, "Napster alone could have had some '75 million users"').
13 See Hilden, supra note 12 (stating that now Napster only allows legal downloads);
see also John Borland, Supreme Court to Hear P2P Case, CNET NEWS.COM, Dec. 10, 2004,
http://news.com.
\com/Supreme+Court+to+hear+P2P+case/2100-1027-3-5487491.html (noting Morpheus
is another file-sharing provider).
14 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster I1), 380 F.3d 1154
(9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
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decision likely to be a landmark in this field.15 Part III will weigh
the benefits and dangers of holding the file sharing software
distributors vicariously liable for the direct infringement of its
users, considering the basic tenets of copyright law, namely,
promoting the progress of sciences and the useful arts.
I. CASE LAW
A. Establishing a Prima Facie Case of Secondary Liability
In order to establish a prima facie case of secondary liability in
copyright infringement cases, plaintiffs must first demonstrate
that the users of the software or websites were engaging in direct
infringement.16 A claim for direct infringement is satisfied when
plaintiffs show both that they own the works in issue and that at
least one of the exclusive rights granted to them as copyright
holders under the Copyright Act of 1976 ("Copyright Act")17 has
been violated.18 Subsequent to the establishment of direct
infringement, the plaintiffs are then required to demonstrate the
elements of either form of secondary liability: contributory or
vicarious. 19 Although these theories were not codified in the
Copyright Act, Congress has acknowledged their existence in the
15 See Hilden, supra note 12 (noting Court's ultimate decision will make Grokster a
landmark of its term); see also John Borland, Last Waltz for Grokster, available at
http://news.coml
Last+waltz+for+Grokster/2100-1027_3-5937832.html, (commenting that the future of the
creative industry is in the Grokster case).
16 See Michael S. Elkin & Alexandra Khlyavich, Napster Near and Far: Will the
Ninth Circuit's Ruling Affect Secondary Infringement in the Outer Reaches of Cyber
Space?, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 381, 388 (2002) (noting plaintiffs have to prove they owned
works and that one exclusive right was violated); A&M Records v. Napster, Inc. (Napster
I), 239 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating "secondary liability for copyright
infringement does not exist" without direct infringement).
17 The Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000) (granting copyright owners the
exclusive rights "to do and to authorize" the reproduction and distribution of their works).
18 See A&M Records, 239 F.3d at 1013 (noting those two points represent points on a
sliding scale).
19 See Lemley, supra note 5, at 1354 (describing what vicarious and contributory
liability is); Kelly M. Maxwell, Software Doesn't Infringe, Users Do? A Critical Look at
MGM v. Grokster and the Recommendation of Appropriate P2P Copyright Infringement
Standards, 13 COMMLAw CONSPECTUS 335, 340-41 (2005) (noting secondary liability
occurs when individual has had some involvement with direct infringement).
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legislative history of the Act,20 and they are also recognized by
both the Supreme Court and lower federal courts. 21
i. Contributory Liability
Contributory liability has been considered an outgrowth of the
tort of enterprise liability, 22 or "the common law doctrine that
one who knowingly participates in or furthers a tortious act is
jointly and severally liable with the prime tortfeasor."23 The
rationale is based on the principle that the person whose
involvement in an activity is limited to an ancillary role is
considered to be equally responsible for the resulting harm and
should bear the consequences for it.24
Following the demonstration of direct infringement, a claim for
contributory liability will be sustained with a showing that the
defendant both (a) had knowledge of the infringement and (b)
made a material contribution to the infringement.25 The Ninth
Circuit has recognized that the knowledge requirement of
contributory copyright infringement encompasses those with
actual knowledge and those who have reason to know of the
20 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 159-60 (1976).
21 See Feder, supra note 1 at 869 (discussing how secondary liability is imposed on
those who "have some degree of involvement in a direct infringement"); see also Elizabeth
Miles, In re Aimster & MGM, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.: Peer-to-Peer and the Sony Doctrine,
19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 21, 22 (2004) (noting that secondary liability for copyright
infringement holds "a second party liable for direct infringement by others," and is judge-
made).
22 See Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 690 F. Supp. 289, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (clarifying
two avenues of third-party liability, vicarious liability "grounded" in respondeat superior,
and contributory infringement "founded" on concept of enterprise liability); see also
Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1293 (D.
Utah 1999) (noting that while benefit and control are "signposts" of various liability,
participation and knowledge are "touchstones" of contributory infringement).
23 Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162
(2d Cir. 1971) (quoting Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark Fi Records, Inc., 256
F. Supp. 399, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)).
24 See Feder, supra note 1, at 872 (comparing concept of enterprise liability to the
concept of "aiding and abetting" in criminal law); see generally Universal Pictures Co. v.
Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 365 (9th Cir. 1947) (demonstrating how writer can be
held liable for damages "as a contributory and participating infringer and joint tort-
feasor").
25 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster fl), 380 F.3d
1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005); (noting that in this particular
case, element of direct infringement was undisputed); see also Playboy Enters v. Russ
Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 506, 514 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (describing another test for
contributory copyright infringement, whereby a person will be liable if she "with
knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the
infringing conduct of another").
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direct infringement. 26  As for the material contribution
requirement, the courts have recognized that these contributions
may be established when a defendant provides "the site and
facilities" for infringement, followed by a failure to discontinue
specific instances of infringement once knowledge of same is
acquired. 27 The two elements are interrelated in the sense that
"the degree to which a party is involved in the activity may affect
the strength of a showing of knowledge that must be shown: a
party's direct involvement in the infringing activity may give rise
to an inference that the party has the requisite knowledge."28
ii. Vicarious Liability
Vicarious liability, often considered an extension of the
doctrine of respondeat superior (holding employers responsible
for the tortuous conduct of their employees), 29 is applicable when
the defendant "'has the right and ability to supervise the
infringing activity and also has a direct financial interest in such
activities."'30 The right and ability to supervise may be based on
contractual rights, even if those rights are not exercised in
practice. 31 Important to note is that while the rule is often
interpreted to indicate a requirement of "direct" financial gain, it
26 See Ellison v. Roberts, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that regardless
of whether a person possessed actual knowledge, or should have had actual knowledge,
plaintiff must also prove that person received financial benefit from another's infringing
activity, if he is to be held vicariously liable); see also UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Sinnott,
300 F. Supp. 2d 993, 998 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (holding that the knowledge requirement for
contributory copyright infringement may be satisfied by constructive knowledge).
27 Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussing
broad "site and facilities" approach); see also UMG Recordings, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1001
(discussing how operation of a flea market satisfied the material contribution requirement
necessary to establish contributory liability, based on the fact that the flea market
provided the "site and facilities" for infringing activities, actually known by the operator).
28 See Feder, supra note 1, at 871.
29 Id. at 869 (noting that vicarious liability, with regard to copyright law, developed
in response to dance halls playing the songs of musical publishers without paying them
royalties for that unauthorized use); see generally Shapiro, Bernstein, & Co. v. H. L.
Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963) (holding that it is "quite clear" that the
normal agency rule of respondeat superior applies to a "servant" who has committed
copyright infringement, while acting within the scope of his employment).
30 A&M Records, Inc, v. Napster, Inc. (Napster I), 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir.
2001).
31 See Feder, supra note 1, at 869 (noting that financial benefit retained must bear
some "direct or indirect relation to the infringing product"); see generally Shapiro, 316
F.2d at 307 (discussing how courts have not drawn "rigid line" between agency cases and
independent contract cases).
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is sufficient for this interest to bear either a direct or indirect
relation to the infringing activity. 32 The collection of admission
fees, concession stand sales, and parking fees are examples of
interests that have satisfied the financial benefit element, while
the mere collection of a fixed rental fee from a premise where
infringing activity occurs is not sufficient to meet this standard.33
The doctrine of vicarious liability originates in the Dance Hall
Cases, 34 where it was clear that a dance hall owner who derived
a benefit from the infringement was in a better position than the
injured composer to bear the costs of liability and redistribute
those costs to others who also derived a benefit from the
infringement. 35 The same notion applies in cases dealing with
Internet copyright infringement: the file sharing distribution
companies who facilitate the illegal downloading of copyrighted
works are in a far better position than those individuals
downloading the copyrighted material to bear the liability of
infringement. 36
B. Copyright Infringement Cases
The continued success and growth of the Internet industry has
created a new realm of legal questions that the law has yet to
fully answer. Decisions in cases of copyright infringement have
varied by circuit and largely turn on the minute details of each
32 See Feder, supra note 1, at 869 (noting that the more common way to describe
financial benefit is simply "direct control").
33 See Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 307 (discussing how issue of infringement ultimately
depends "merely upon a legal conclusion to be drawn from a consideration of the parties'
relationship"); see also Feder, supra note 1, at 869 (demonstrating how liability stems
from fixed control of the unit and space or premises in question).
34 See Dreamland Ball Room, Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354, 355 (7th
Cir. 1929) (holding dance hall owners liable for music played in their facilities if music
aided them in receiving profit from patrons); see also Feder, supra note 1, 869 (noting that
publishers of music were not receiving royalties for their work from dance hall owners).
35 See Dreamland Ball Room, 36 F.2d at 355 (rejecting contention that contract made
with orchestra turned dance hall into independent contractor who was shielded from
liability); see generally Feder, supra note 1, at 871 (citing the doctrine of unjust
enrichment as one rationale why liability can be imposed).
36 See Feder, supra note 1, at 871 (discussing how there "is certainly an intuitive
force" guiding principle that file sharing companies are at least partially to blame for the
copyright infringement" as they are deriving some benefit from operation); see generally
A&M Records v. Napster, Inc. (Napster II), 239 F.3d 1004, 1019-20 (9th Cir. 2001)
(applying standard to Napster, who had both actual and constructive knowledge of direct
infringement based on their experience in industry).
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case, as precedent has demonstrated. 37 A review of the seminal
copyright infringement cases offers some insight into how the
legal system will assign future liability in the area.
i. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.
One of the earliest cases dealing with secondary liability and
copyright infringement was Sony Corp. of America v. Universal
City Studios, Inc.38 In that case, petitioner, Sony Corp.,
manufactured and sold Betamax home video tape recorders. 39
The respondents were copyright owners for some of the programs
that were televised on public airwaves; 40 members of the general
public used petitioner's video tape recorders to copy some of these
televised broadcasts.41 Respondents alleged that in so doing,
these individuals had infringed upon their copyrights.42 Based on
a theory of secondary liability, respondents further contended
that petitioner was liable for the alleged copyright infringement
of the Betamax consumers because petitioners marketed the
Betamax recorders. 43
After a very detailed and comprehensive analysis, the Supreme
Court held that the sale of video tape recorders could not assign
contributory copyright infringement to petitioner Sony Corp.,
even though the company knew the consumers were using the
machines to commit infringement.44 In utilizing the 'staple
article of commerce' doctrine found in patent law,45 the Supreme
37 See e.g., Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1019-20 (holding Napster liable for contributory
liability); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Sinnott, 300 F. Supp.2d 993, 1001 (E.D. Ca. 2004)
(holding that operator of flea market is contributorily liable for direct infringement when
it provides the site and facilities for "known infringing activities"). But see Sony Corp. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984) (finding videotape recording
machine manufacturers and retailers not liable for contributory infringement on the
grounds that they merely provided the technology without any ancillary support for
potentially infringing activity).
38 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
39 Id. at 419.
40 See id. at 419-20.
41 See id. at 420.
42 See id.
43 See id.
44 See id. at 456.
45 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster I1), 125 S. Ct.
2764, 2777 (2005) (explaining traditional staple article of commerce doctrine reflected in
patent law stating that distribution of component of patented device will not violate the
patent if it is suitable for use in other ways); see also A&M Records v. Napster, Inc.
(Napster HI), 239 F.3d 1004, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2001) (adopting the modified staple article
[Vol. 21:1
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Court determined that a claim of contributory copyright
infringement could be effectively rebutted if petitioner could
show that the product at issue was "capable of substantial" or
"commercially significant non-infringing uses." 46  Therefore,
because petitioner's Betamax video tape recorders were capable
of commercially significant non-infringing uses, constructive
knowledge of the infringement could not be attributed to Sony
although the company knew that the recorders could be used for
infringing purposes. 47  In short, a product's capability for
substantial non-infringing uses acts as a shield against
contributory liability for its distributor, without regard for its
purpose or the proportion of actual infringing use.48
ii. Napster
The first peer-to-peer file sharing software distributor to be
charged with copyright infringement was Napster. 49 Created by
college student Shawn Fanning, the program was designed as a
means of locating obscure music on the Internet. 50 Napster
utilized a combination of client-server and peer-to-peer structure
in which music files were stored on users' computers while a
of commerce doctrine followed in Sony where Court declined to impute requisite level of
knowledge where defendants made and sold equipment capable of both infringing and
substantial non-infringing uses and did not have specific knowledge of such
infringement).
46 See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984)
(stating that "copying equipment" does not constitute contributory infringement without
need to explore every possible use if the item is capable of commercially significant, non-
infringing uses).
47 See id. (characterizing this non-infringing use as non-commercial "home-shifting"
of television programs, which could be authorized by other copyright holders, or are
alternatively "fair use" of the program).
48 See Sony, 464 U.S. at 442 (emphasizing that the existence of substantial
noninfringing uses prevents the invocation of copyright infringement); see also Miles,
supra note 21, at 36 (noting that even single noninfringing use activates the Sony shield
of liability).
49 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (Napster 1), 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 927 (N.D.
Cal. 2000) (enjoining Napster from facilitating copying of plaintiff record companies'
music); see also Miles, supra note 21, at 27 (commenting on how recording industry
alleged that Napster committed contributory and vicarious infringement by allowing
unauthorized sharing of music).
50 See Napster 1, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 902 (describing Napster as "the brainchild of a
college student who wanted to facilitate music-swapping by his roommate); see also Elkin,
supra note 16, at 387 (explaining how system allowed users to obtain songs available for
copying and downloading onto their own computers).
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centralized server 51 conducted file searches and transfers by
listing the names and locations of those files available for
sharing.5 2 Napster was able to evade a charge of direct copyright
infringement because the files were actually stored on the users'
computers, not on a central server. 53 Copyright owners struck
back under the umbrella of the Recording Industry Association of
America ("RIAA"). Eighteen prominent record companies filed a
complaint against Napster for contributory and vicarious
copyright infringement based on its facilitation of the
unauthorized sharing of copyrighted material by its software
users.
54
On July 26, 2000, Chief Judge Marilyn Patel of the District
Court for the Northern District of California found that plaintiffs
had established a likelihood of success on their claims for
contributory and vicarious liability against Napster and issued a
preliminary injunction enjoining Napster "from engaging in, or
facilitating others in copying, downloading, uploading,
transmitting, or distributing plaintiffs' copyrighted musical
compositions and sound recordings, protected by either federal or
state law, without express permission of the rights owner."55
Although the Ninth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction
in part, it kept in effect most of Chief Judge Patel's conclusions of
51 See Feder, supra note 1, at 864 (distinguishing peer-to-peer transactions in which
resources reside on multitude of networked PCs that may be acting simultaneously as
both clients and servers from central indexing server system where each user on the peer-
to-peer network can search the entire network because all of the index entries are always
in one place); see also Miles, supra note 21, at 27 (explaining how Napster enabled music
files to reside on individual users' computers).
52 See Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 901 (recounting how Napster enables people who
have downloaded software to log-on to Napster system and share MP3 music files with
other users who are also logged-on); see also Miles, supra note 21, at 27 (noting that not
all peer-to-peer networks are completely decentralized, as with Napster where a
centralized server facilitates file searches and transfers by indexing the names and
locations of files available to be shared).
53 See Sarah D. Glasebrook, Comment, "Sharing's Only Fun When It's Not Your
Stuff': Napster.corn Pushes the Envelope of Indirect Copyright Infringement, 69 UMKC L.
REV. 811, 811-12 (2001) (highlighting how Napster system allowed anyone with access to
the Internet to download MP3 files to their individual computers for free); see also Miles,
supra note 21, at 27 (accrediting structure of Napster with enabling it to evade direct
copyright infringement liability because there was no central site to sue).
54 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (Napster 1), 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 900 (N.D.
Cal. 2000).
55 Id. at 925.
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law with regard to the likelihood of Napster's liability. 56 In
reviewing the Chief Judge's decision for a potential abuse of
discretion, the court found that through its software
Napster allowed its users to: (1) make MP3 music files stored
on individual computer hard drives available for copying by
other Napster users; (2) search for MP3 music files stored on
other users' computers; and (3) transfer exact copies of the
contents of other users' MP3 files from one computer to
another via the Internet.57
In making its determination, the court interpreted the Sony
'non-infringing use' doctrine narrowly and applied the rule as a
test for the knowledge prong of contributory liability, instead of
as an absolute shield against secondary liability. 58 The court
contended that Sony prohibited it from assigning "the requisite
level of knowledge to Napster merely because peer-to-peer file
sharing technology may be used to infringe plaintiffs'
copyrights," 59 but instead asserted that "Napster's actual,
specific knowledge of direct infringement renders Sony's holding
of limited assistance."60
The court in Napster H modified the Sony test by adding a two-
step analysis to the test for contributory liability: (1) a defendant
whose product is determined to have substantial non-infringing
uses will not be charged with constructive knowledge of
infringement based on the product design, and (2) the court may
review the record for evidence of defendant's actual knowledge
56 See generally A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., (Napster II), 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir.
2000) (affirming District Court's findings that the plaintiffs would likely succeed in
showing that defendants did not have fair use defense and defendants' liability as
contributory infringer and vicarious infringer); see also Elkin, supra note 16, at 388
(stating that "[t]he Ninth Circuit's analysis of Napster's liability for the peer-to-peer file
sharing it facilitated defines the boundaries of secondary infringement liability vis-a-vis
the Internet in the United States).
57 See Napster II, 239 F.3dat 1011.
58 See id. at 1021-22.
59 Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1020-21 (holding that Napster will not be imputed with
requisite level of knowledge simply because A&M's copyrights may have been infringed);
see David Balaban, Note, The Battle of the Music Industry: The Distribution of Audio and
Video Works via the Internet, Music and More, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 235, 283 n.319 (2001) (noting that "[flollowing Sony, the Ninth Circuit declined to
impute the requisite level of knowledge where the defendants msazade and sold
equipment capable of both infringing and 'significant noninfringing uses"').
60 Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1020 (stating that the Sony doctrine has limited application
when the secondary infringer has actual knowledge of the violation).
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arising from defendant's conduct. 61 Using this test, the court
determined that although Napster's services did have
"substantial non-infringing uses," the company had actual
knowledge of user infringement based on its centralized file
index and the notices of infringement it had received from the
plaintiffs in the case.62 In its holding, the Ninth Circuit stated
that "if a computer system operator learns of specific infringing
material available on his system and fails to purge such material
from the system, the operator knows of and contributes to direct
infringement."63
After establishing the first prong of contributory liability, the
court faced the second: causation, inducement, or material
involvement. The court found that Napster provided the "site
and facilities" for infringement in the form of its "integrated
service" which was used for finding and downloading files, and
thus Napster had "materially contribute[d] to the direct
infringement."64
Additionally, the court found Napster vicariously liable for
copyright infringement, as it had the ability "to supervise and
control" the infringing conduct of its users through its file
index,65 thereby satisfying the standard set forth in Fonovisa,
61 See Miles, supra note 21, at 28 (describing two-step analysis set forth in Napster
II); see also Laura E. Hancock, Contributory and Vicarious Copyright Infringement as
Applied to Auctions, Flea Markets, and Swap Meets: How Fonovisa and Napster Have Set
the Standard, 9 COMP. L. REV. & TECH. J. 295, 311 (2005) (noting that the Ninth Circuit
"relied heavily on the district court's findings in finding both actual and constructive
knowledge").
62 See A&M Records v. Napster, Inc. (Napster I1), 239 F.3d 1004, 1020-22 (9th Cir.
2000) (ruling that Napster had knowledge sufficient "to impose contributory liability
when linked to demonstrated infringing use of the Napster system"); Miles, supra note 21,
at 28 (restating Ninth Circuit's findings).
63 Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1021 (ruling that once "a computer system operator learns
of specific infringement material on his system and fails to" remove it, he "knows of and
contributes to direct copyright infringement"); Grace J. Bergen, The Napster Case: The
Whole World is Listening, 15 TRANSNAT'L LAw. 259, 266 (2002) (quoting Ninth Circuit's
ruling on contributory infringement).
64 Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1022; see Daniel D. Hill, Note, A & M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc.: A Victory in the War to Sound the Digital Death Knell for Peer-to-Peer
Online File Sharing, 12 WIDENER L.J. 161, 176-77 (2003) (noting the Ninth Circuit's
finding of material contribution to infringement in Napster I).
65 See A&M Records v. Napster, Inc. (Napster 11), 239 F.3d 1004, 1023-24 (9th Cir.
2001) (ruling that in spite of limited ability to police its system, Napster was vicariously
liable for copyright infringement); Hill, supra note 64, at 177 (reiterating Ninth Circuit's
finding that Napster had limited control and supervision of its users).
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Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc. 66 and other precedent. The court
then found that Napster had received financial benefit from the
customer lure that the infringing capability supplied.67
If read broadly, the Napster II holding implicitly provides
courts with precedent to hold all service providers liable if they
have reason to know their software or website is being used in an
infringing manner. 68
iii. In Re: Aimster Copyright Litigation
Unlike Napster, Aimster was a file sharing system that
operated on the already existing client-server platform that
America Online ("AOL") provided, thereby creating a peer-to-peer
network when connected to AOL's Instant Messaging service
("IM").69 Aimster provided a means by which its users could
identify large numbers of other users with whom they could
share files in encrypted form and to whom they could send
instant messages. 70 Additionally, Aimster provided a feature
66 See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996)
(concluding that "providing the site and facilities for known infringing activity is
sufficient to establish contributory liability"); Fonovisa, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 4270, at *13 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (stating vicarious copyright infringement
standard (citing Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1013 n.2, 1019)).
67 Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1023 (agreeing with District Court's determination that
"Napster financially benefit[ed] from the availability of protected works on its system," as
its revenue was directly related to increased traffic that resulted); Miles, supra note 21, at
29 (noting Ninth Circuit's finding that Napster "received financial benefit from the
customer draw the infringing capability supplied").
68 See Elkin, supra note 16, at 385 (arguing that Napster II allows courts to hold
service providers, "who have reason to know that their software or website is being used
for infringing purposes, liable to copyright holders for contributory infringement"); see
also Hancock, supra note 61, at 317 (arguing that service providers like Napster should be
held vicariously liable when they know their products are being used in infringing
manner and do not act on their knowledge).
69 In re: Aimster Copyright Litig. (Aimster 1), 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 638 (N.D. Ill.
2002). AOL IM enables users to communicate with each other by sending messages and
files in real time through AOL servers. Each user is required to download IM software to
her own computer and the software then locates other users that she had previously
designated as her "buddies" when they are connected to the Internet. The software
provides the connection for instant messaging and file exchanges and additionally allows
users to specify files on their hard drives available for transfers to other buddies upon
request. Id. at 638. The "Aim" in "Aimster" refers to AOL Instant Messenger, which
resulted in a trademark dispute between Aimster and AOL-Time Warner. See Feder,
supra note 1, at 884 n.128. The Aimster software and services have since been renamed
"Madster," and are now located at www.madster.com. See Aimster I, 252 F. Supp. 2d at
638 n.1.
70 Aimster I, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 638 (describing purpose of Aimster software); see
Haydn J. Richards Jr., Note and Comment, Is the Whole Greater Than the Sum of Its
Parts? The Applicability of the Fair Use Doctrine to the New Breed of Instant Messaging
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called 'Club Aimster,' which allowed subscribers to download the
most shared songs from the network for a small monthly fee.71 A
Club Aimster member would only have to visit Aimster's website,
view the 'Aimster Top 40' list, and select a title to begin a search
of the network to find and obtain a file. 72 In sum, Aimster added
three features to the existing AOL structure: (1) encryption -
used to protect the identity of the users and the content of their
transfers; (2) the capability to search and transfer files between
all other Aimster users; and (3) Club Aimster, a centralized file
index potentially similar to the one offered by Napster. 73
Although the factual record is unclear, it appears that the
Aimster system as a whole operated a central database index. 74
The district court found that all of the elements of contributory
infringement had been satisfied. 75 The court stated that it was
"unequivocally established that Aimster's users are engaged in
direct copyright infringement." 76 It further found that Aimster
had both actual and constructive knowledge of the infringing use
and, since it "provided the software and the support services
Software, 8 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 15, 54 (2001) (noting that "the Aimster service can act as
an instant e-mail courier for any type of files including text files, images, and sounds").
71 See Miles, supra note 21, at 32-33 (listing the features Club Aimster offered its
members); see also Jennifer Norman, Staying Alive: Can the Recording Industry Survive
Peer-to-Peer?, 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 371, 385 (2003) (describing Club Aimster).
72 See Miles, supra note 21, at 32-33 (stating that a "paying club member needed only
to visit Aimster's website, view the 'Aimster Top 40' list, and click on a title to initiate a
search of the network to locate and transmit the file"); see also Norman, supra note 71, at
385 (observing that "users who paid for Club Aimster did not have to use the search
function if they downloaded from the top 40 list presented at log-in").
73 See Miles, supra note 21, at 33 (listing three features Aimster added to AOL); see
also Lee B. Burgunder, Reflections on Napster: The Ninth Circuit Takes a Walk on the
Wild Side, 39 AM. Bus. L.J. 683, 704 (2002) (noting "a program distributed via Aimster
called the Aimster Pig Encoder that used a form of pig Latin to disguise file names").
74 See Feder, supra note 1, at 884 (concluding that Aimster had central database
index); see also Robert A. Gilmore, Peer-to-Peer: Copyright Jurisprudence in the New File-
Sharing World, The Post Grokster Landscape of Indirect Copyright Infringement and the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 5 FL. COASTAL L.J. 85, 101-02 (2004) (stating that
Aimster I refused to decide whether Aimster had a centralized database and that its
decision would stand regardless of the answer, in spite of the court's awareness of that
issue's significance in Napster 1).
75 Aimster Copyright Litig. (Aimster 1), 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 654 (N.D. Ill. 2002)
(ruling that Aimster '"had knowledge of and materially contributed to the infringing
activity" of its users); Feder, supra note 1, at 884 (noting District Court ruling).
76 See Aimster I, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 648 (finding that plaintiffs proved that "they own
or control the copyrights for works copied and distributed using the Aimster system");
Myrick, supra note 4, at 552 (stating District Court's finding).
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necessary for individual Aimster users to connect with each
other," its contribution to the infringement was material. 77
Aimster contended that it was not a contributory infringer
because, as per Sony, the system was capable of substantial non-
infringing uses.78 Incorporated in this argument was "the ability
of Aimster users to transfer any number and type of non-
copyrighted files and messages to other users, and the.ability of
users to identify other users with similar interests, share
information and develop clubs."79 Aimster additionally asserted
that businesses could use its system "to exchange business
records securely and efficiently" without a network
administrator.80 The district court, however, rejected Aimster's
assertion of the Sony doctrine on five distinct grounds, and held
that "the protections of Sony [were] simply not applicable to the
instant case."81
Despite the fact that the Seventh Circuit rejected the district
court's attempts to distinguish Sony, it still held Aimster liable
for contributory infringement.8 2 The court found unpersuasive
the recording industry's argument that the Sony doctrine did not
77 See Aimster I, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 652 (discussing Aimster's contributions to its
users' infringement and ruling that they were material); Feder, supra note 1, at 885
(stating district court's finding that Aimster's contributions were material).
78 Aimster I, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 652 (noting Aimster's argument that its program has
"substantial non-infringing uses' as identified by the Supreme Court" in Sony); Norman,
supra note 71, at 386 (discussing Aimster's unsuccessful argument that "it was shielded
from liability under the Sony doctrine because its system was a 'staple article of
commerce' capable of 'substantial non-infringing uses"').
79 Id. at 653.
80 Id.
81 Aimster Copyright Litig. (Aimster 1), 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 654 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
First, the District Court distinguished the present case from Sony because the primary
use of the Betamax video recorder in Sony was for non-infringing uses. See id. at 653. It
found that Aimster had not provided any evidence that its system was used for non-
infringing uses and that, even if it had, "the mere inclusion of such evidence would not
suffice unless it tended to show that such constituted Aimster's primary use." Id. Second,
the court concluded that Aimster did not provide a "staple article of commerce," but an
ongoing service "more closely akin to the swap meet in Fonovisa." Id. Third, the court
distinguished the present case from Sony based on the fact that, in Sony, the users
engaged in "private, home use," while the users of the Aimster system were "global
distributors" of copyrighted works. Id. at 653-54. Fourth, the court determined that Sony
did not provide a protection to those who created devices specifically designed for
infringing activity, even if the product was capable of non-infringing uses. Id. at 654.
Lastly, the district court held that Sony was inapplicable because Aimster actively
encouraged infringement. Id.
82 See In re Aimster Copyright Litigation (Aimster fl), 334 F.3d 643, 656 (7th Cir.
2003). The court chose to criticize the appellant's brief instead of addressing the district
court's shortcomings directly. See id. at 648-49; see also Feder, supra note 1, at 886.
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apply to service providers.8 3 It found, instead, that the provider
of a service is often in a better position to prevent or reduce
infringement than is the manufacturer of a product.8 4 The
"ability of a service provider to prevent its customers from
infringing is a factor to be considered in determining whether the
provider is a contributory infringer."85 The court also noted,
however, that there may be instances where it may be "highly
burdensome" for a service provider to prevent infringement; in
such cases, the product is capable of non-infringing uses, and the
staple article of commerce rationale applies equally well to
service providers.8 6
While the opinion of the Seventh Circuit stated that a service
provider's ability to prevent infringement "is a factor to be
considered" in a copyright infringement case, it did not express
how and with what weight it is to be considered.8 7 In fact, absent
from the opinion is any discussion of whether preventing
infringement would indeed be "highly burdensome" to Aimster. 88
The court seems to imply that the ability of a service provider to
prevent infringement is a threshold question to determining
which analysis to apply - the Sony doctrine or the traditional test
of contributory infringement.89
Upon making a determination that the Aimster system as a
whole should be evaluated under the Sony doctrine, the court
proceeded to review Aimster's potential non-infringing uses.90
While the Seventh Circuit noted that the Supreme Court in Sony
83 Aimster II, 334 F.3d at 648.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.; see also Feder, supra note 1, at 886 (arguing that rationale that supported
application of staple article of commerce test to Sony applies equally well to service
provider in situations where such circumstances exist).
87 See In re Aimster Copyright Litigation (Aimster 11), 334 F.3d 643, 648 (7th Cir.
2003).
88 See id.; see also Feder, supra note 1, at 886 (noting that "there is no discussion of
whether preventing infringement would be 'highly burdensome' to Aimster in the court's
application of the staple article of commerce test to the Aimster system").
89 See Aimster II, 334 F.3d at 648; see also Feder, supra note 1, at 887 (stating that
"the service provider's ability to prevent infringement is relevant in determining the
preliminary question of which test to apply (Sony's staple article of commerce test or the
traditional test for contributory infringement) but not to the ultimate question of
infringement").
90 See Aimster II, 334 F.3d at 652. The court theorizes and lists several examples of
"actually or arguably non-infringing uses" of Aimster's service. See id.
[Vol. 2 1:1
FUTURE OF COP YRIGHT1NFRINGEMENT
had held that a product's potential non-infringing uses were
adequate to overcome a claim of contributory infringement, 91 it
found that "the question is how probable they are. It is not
enough... that a product or service be physically capable, as it
were, of a non-infringing use."92 The court interpreted Sony to
require a balancing of infringing and non-infringing uses: "when
a supplier is offering a product or service that has non-infringing
as well as infringing uses, some estimate of the respective
magnitudes of these uses is necessary for a finding of
contributory infringement."93 It ruled that there was no evidence
before the court that any Aimster user had actually used the
system for any of the non-infringing uses it identified, while the
facts in Sony established that the Betamax recorder's "principal
use" was non-infringing. 94 It further stated that in situations
where the infringing uses are substantial, the service provider
must show that it would have been "disproportionately costly" for
him to prevent or meaningfully reduce the infringing uses in
order to avoid liability.95
The Seventh Circuit ultimately concluded that Aimster's Sony
defense failed, and it affirmed the district court's finding of
contributory infringement. 96 Writing for the court, Judge Posner
stated that Aimster's software tutorial "aided and abetted"
infringing use because it listed only songs that were protected by
copyright in its examples: "[t]he tutorial is the invitation to
infringement that the Supreme Court found missing in Sony."9 7
The Court also found material contribution in Club Aimster
because the songs listed in the Aimster Top 40 were all
copyright-protected. 98  Judge Posner additionally noted the
monthly fee paid by the Aimster subscribers as further evidence
91 Aimster II, 334 F.3d at 650.
92 In re Aimster Copyright Litigation (Aimster I), 334 F.3d 643, 656 (7th Cir. 2003);
cf. Feder, supra note 1, at 887 (suggesting that Sony requires a weighing of infringing and
noninfringing uses).
93 See Aimster II, 334 F.3d at 653. As Aimster failed to produce any evidence that its
service was used for noninfringing uses, it was impossible for the court to compare the
frequency of such noninfringing use with infringing uses. See id.at 649.
94 See id. at 653.
95 See id. at 656.
96 Id. at 651.
97 In re Aimster Copyright Litigation (Aimster 11), 334 F.3d 643, 651 (7th Cir. 2003).
98 Id. at 652.
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of the company's liability.99 In applying the 'willful blindness'
test, the court determined that Aimster's activities satisfied the
knowledge prong.100 Despite the fact that the encryption
prevented actual knowledge of the transfers, the court concluded
that Aimster willfully blinded itself to the infringement of its
users. 101 In other words, Aimster could have observed and
controlled the infringement, but the encryption process was
seemingly implemented in order to shield the company from any
secondary liability.102 After making a finding of contributory
liability, Judge Posner did not address the issue of vicarious
liability. 103
II. METRO-GOLDWYN-MAYER STUDIOS, INC. V. GROKSTER, LTD.
A. Facts and Procedural History
Most recently, the issue of secondary copyright infringement
liability has arisen in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd.104 The Plaintiffs in the consolidated cases are
various songwriters, music publishers, and motion picture
studios who "own or control the vast majority of copyrighted
motion pictures and sound recordings in the United States."105
The Defendants, Grokster, Ltd. and StreamCast Networks,
99 See Aimster II, 334 F.3d at 651-52 (discussing monthly membership fee); Miles,
supra note 21, at 34 (noting mention by court that monthly fee was further evidence of
liability).
100 Aimster II, 334 F.3d at 650-51 (finding Aimster "blinded itself'); see Miles, supra
note 21, at 34 (discussing court's finding that Aimster used encryption software to
intentionally blind itself).
101 See Aimster II, 334 F.3d at 654-55 (stating that Aimster "hampered its search for
evidence by providing encryption [and therefore] must take responsibility for that self-
inflicted wound"); see also Miles, supra note 21, at 34 (noting that the court "concluded
that Aimster willfully blinded itself to infringing activity").
102 See In re Aimster Copyright Litigation (Aimster I1), 334 F.3d 643, 656 (7th Cir.
2003) (discussing how Aimster could have limited amount of infringement by eliminating
encryption); Miles, supra note 21, at 34 (discussing court's view that company engaged in
conduct designed to exculpate itself from the knowledge requirement).
103 See Miles, supra note 21, at 34 (noting that Judge Posner did not address
vicarious liability); see generally Aimster II, 334 F.3d 643 (failing to address issue of
vicarious liability).
104 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster 1), 259 F. Supp. 2d
1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster I),
380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster II1), 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
105 Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1158.
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Inc.,106 are companies that distribute peer-to-peer file sharing
software, 'Grokster' and 'Morpheus' respectively, which permits
users to exchange computer files with each other at no cost.107
These computer files include digitized music and motion
pictures. 08 The Plaintiffs allege that over ninety percent of the
files exchanged by users of the defendants' peer-to-peer file
sharing software involves copyrighted works, seventy percent of
which is owned by the Plaintiffs themselves. 0 9 The Plaintiffs,
therefore, allege that the Defendants are liable for vicarious and
contributory copyright infringement violations, pursuant to 17
U.S.C. §§ 501-13,110 for which they are entitled to monetary and
injunctive relief."'l
In April 2003, the district court granted Grokster and
StreamCast summary judgment as to their liability regarding the
dissemination of file sharing software, and certified the resolved
questions for appeal.112 This marked the first victory of peer-to-
peer file distributors in a copyright infringement suit brought by
members of the entertainment industry.113  The Plaintiffs
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit by presenting the issue of whether distributors of peer-to-
peer file sharing software are secondarily liable for the copyright
infringement of the software's users.11 4
106 See Elliot Zimmerman, Entertainment, Arts and Sports Law: P2P File Sharing:
Direct and Indirect Copyright Infringement, 78 FLA. BAR J. 40, 44 (2004) (noting initial
lawsuit was comprised of three defendants - makers of Kazaa, Morpheus, and Grokster -
but summary judgment was only awarded to StreamCast (Morpheus) and Grokster). See
generally Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1154 (noting parties to suit).
107 Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1158.
108 Id.
109 Id.
109 17 USC §§ 501-13 (2000).
110 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster I1), 380 F.3d 1154, 1158
(9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
112 See Lemley, supra note 5, at 1362 (discussing summary judgment granted by
district court in April 2003). See generally Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster 1), 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (granting summary
judgment to Grokster and StreamCast).
113 See Zimmerman, supra note 106, at 44 (recognizing decision was first victory by
P2P developers in a copyright action); Andrew J. Lee, MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.
& In re Aimster Litigation: A Study of Secondary Copyright Liability in the Peer-to-Peer
Context, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 485 (2005) (stating that Grokster 11 marks first time
P2P provider successfully defended copyright action).
114 Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1157 (phrasing issue on appeal as "whether distributors of
peer-to-peer file-sharing computer networking software may be held contributorily or
vicariously liable for copyright infringements by users").
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In August 2004, the Ninth Circuit ultimately held that the file
sharing software distributors in this case were not liable for
contributory or vicarious copyright infringement, and affirmed
the district court's grant of partial summary judgment.115 The
court began its analysis by noting that the issue presented in this
case was not one of direct copyright infringement, but instead an
issue of whether the Defendants were liable for the infringement
of its software users, based on the theory of secondary liability.116
The Ninth Circuit made its decision based on an in depth
analysis of the intricate structure and mechanical nature of the
software the companies disseminated. The Supreme Court
reviewed the ruling in this case on March 29, 2005;
understanding the factual elements that the Ninth Circuit
deemed critical is essential to critiquing the conclusion at which
the Court arrived.
B. Understanding Peer-to-Peer File Sharing
Similar to those who utilized the Napster program, Grokster
users are able to exchange various types of files quite easily."l 7
Also akin to Napster, the peer-to-peer network offers an interface
which permits software users to select, upload, and download
files directly from other users' hard drives without the aid of
software distributors. 118 In fact, to its users, the basic features of
the Napster and Grokster programs are very similar.119
115 Id. (concluding that defendants were "not liable for contributory and vicarious
copyright infringement").
116 Id. at 1160 (stating that "question of direct copyright infringement is not at issue
[but instead] Copyright Owners rely on the two recognized theories of secondary copyright
liability: contributory copyright infringement and vicarious copyright infringement").
117 See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster 1), 259 F.Supp.2d 1029, 1029
(C.D. Cal. 2003) (stating that users of Grokster "were able to exchange files seamlessly");
see also A&M Records v. Napster, Inc. (Napster 11), 239 F. 3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2000)
(discussing the ease in which Napster users may share files).
118 See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster I), 380 F.3d 1154, 1159-60
(9th Cir. 2004) (explaining Grokster-licensed FastTrack technology which enables users to
share digital audio, video, picture, and text files by initiating file search without
StreamCast or Grokster maintaining control over index files); see also Tom Graves, Note
Picking Up the Pieces of Grokster: A New Approach to File Sharing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. &
ENT. L.J. 137, 152 (2004) (explaining that Grokster's "P2P Software" allows users to
connect to an independent peer-to-peer network not controlled by software distributors).
119 See Grokster I, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1032 (noting that both Grokster and Morpheus
platforms operate in manner conceptually analogous to Napster system described at
length by the District Court in Napster); see also Graves, supra note 118, at 152 (noting
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However, there is one underlying structural difference between
the two programs that has proven significant in litigation.120
Unlike Napster, which made information available on a
centralized index that it maintained by utilizing a combination of
client-server and peer-to-peer architecture, Grokster and
StreamCast operated solely on a peer-to-peer distribution
network.121 Therefore, Grokster does not operate one primary
computer that maintains all of the available information for its
users. 122 Instead, each user's computer offers information to
every other computer in the peer-to-peer network and therefore
acts as both client and server. 123 More simply, the Grokster
software allows users to connect to an independent peer-to-peer
network that is not controlled by software distributors.124
However, because the information is decentralized in a peer-to-
peer network, the software must offer some method of organizing
that from the user's standpoint the basic features of the P2P Software were the same as
the Napster system).
120 See Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1159 (explaining the difference between Napster's
centralized indexing software architecture, the decentralized index peer-to-peer file-
sharing model, and the "supernode" model presently at issue); see also Graves, supra note
118, at 153 (explaining that with Grokster neither digital files to be downloaded nor
names of files are stored on centralized server, whereas Napster maintained list of
available files).
121 See Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1159. A Napster user who sought a digital copy of a
recording would transmit a search request to the Napster server, the software would
conduct a text search of the centralized index for the matching files, and the search
results would be transmitted to the requestor. Id. If the search results indicated that
another Napster user was logged onto the server at that moment and was offering the
requested recording, the requestor could then connect directly with the providing user
and download the music file to her own computer. Id.
122 See Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1163 (stating that under both StreamCast's
decentralized network and Grokster's quasi-decentralized supernode, no central index is
maintained); see also Graves, supra note 118, at 152-53 (explaining that the users select
and download files directly from other users' hard drives to their own as neither the
digital files nor the names of the files are stored on any Grokster-centralized server).
123 See Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1158 (explaining that in peer-to-peer distribution
network, no one computer contains all the information as it is each computer that makes
the information available to every other computer in the network); see also Graves, supra
note 118, at 152 (explaining that the P2P Software provides an interface which allows
users to select and download audio from files on other users' hard drives to their own and
exchanging files "seamlessly").
124 See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster I), 380 F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th
Cir. 2004) (explaining because each computer acts as both server and client, even if
Software Distributors deactivated all computers within their control, users of their
product could "continue sharing files with little or no interruption"); see also Graves,
supra note 118, at 152 (noting that Grokster's software allows user to connect through
network not controlled by the Software Distributors).
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the available files so that it may be easily accessed by its users;
in other words, a file index is essential.125
Grokster currently utilizes the "supernode" model of
indexing.126 When a user connects to a network computer
designated as an index server and requests a particular file, the
index server, or supernode, will search its index and provide the
user with the results of the search.127 StreamCast has recently
been utilizing Gnutella software system, a totally decentralized
indexing system, which requires each user to maintain an index
of only those files she wishes to make available to other users in
the network.128 The software transmits a search request to all
computers on the network and the combined results are sent
back to the requesting user.129
C. The Ninth Circuit Ruling - Software Distributors Not Liable
The Ninth Circuit found that Grokster and StreamCast were
not liable for contributory infringement because their activity did
not satisfy the required knowledge and material contribution
elements of the cause of action.130 Specifically, the court held
125 See Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1158 (explaining that because information in P2P
network is decentralized, "the software must provide some method of cataloguing the
available information so that users may access it"); see also A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc. (Napster 1), 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 906 (N.D. Cal 2000) (noting necessity of indexing
system in Napster's P2P network).
126 See Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1159 (noting that "supernode" was developed by
Dutch company KaZaa BV and later transferred to Sharman Networks, licensed under
name of "FastTrack"); see also Feder, supra note 1, at 865 (noting "supernode" model
utilized by Grokster as one of three types of peer-to-peer file sharing).
127 See Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1159 (explaining that with the "supernode" model a
number of select computers on the network are designated as indexing servers); see also
Feder, supra note 1, at 865 (explaining that with "supernode" model, select number of
nodes act as indexing servers).
128 See Grokster 11, 380 F.3d at 1159 (noting that with completely decentralized
networks each node maintains indices of material that resides on that node); see also
Feder, supra note 1, at 865 (explaining that decentralized networks of "fully distributed"
model limits user's access to entire network because of variety of sources for indexing
information).
129 See Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1159 (explaining that under a decentralized index the
software broadcasts a search request to all computers on network and search of individual
index files, with collective results routed back to the requesting computer); see also Feder,
supra note 1, at 865 (stating that every search request is broadcast to each node in order
to locate desired material requested by user).
130 See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster I), 380 F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th
Cir. 2004) (noting that as neither StreamCast nor Grokster maintained control over the
index files and even if they deactivated all computers within their control, users of their
products could still share files with little or no interruption).
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that liability for contributory copyright infringement requires the
defendant to have knowledge of definite acts of direct
infringement at a time when the defendant materially
contributed to such direct infringement.131 Furthermore, the
court found that the Defendants were also not liable for vicarious
copyright infringement liability because they did not have the
right and ability to supervise the infringing activity of their
users. 132
i. Contributory Infringement
As discussed in Part I of this article, a finding of contributory
copyright infringement requires knowledge of direct
infringement and material contribution to that infringement.133
The Ninth Circuit interpreted the knowledge requirement in this
context to mean actual knowledge of the infringing activity at a
time when the defendant materially contributed to the direct
infringement, thereby creating a "temporal nexus."134 This
interpretation stems from the same court's decision in
Napster,135 which required a higher showing of knowledge when
the direct infringement pertained to an article of commerce
capable of substantial non-infringing uses; constructive
knowledge of the direct infringement will not sustain a
contributory liability claim in such cases. 136 The court noted
131 Id. at 1162 (stating contributory copyright infringement required Copyright
Owners establish Software Distributors' knowledge and material contribution).
132 Id. at 1165 (holding that it did not appear from any evidence on record that any
defendants had ability to block access to individual users).
133 See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster 1), 259 F.Supp.2d 1029, 1036
(C.D. Cal. 2003) (citing that liability for contributory infringement accrues where
defendant has actual and not merely constructive knowledge of infringement at time
during which defendant materially contributes to that infringement).
134 See A&M Records v. Napster, Inc. (Napster I1), 239 F. 3d 1004, 1021 (9th Cir.
2000) (noting that if a computer system operator learns of specific infringing material
available on his system and fails to purge such material from the system, the operator
knows of and contributes to direct infringement); see also Graves, supra note 118, at 148
(noting that the Ninth Circuit required a temporal nexus between this specific knowledge
and the ability to block the infringement).
135 See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1022 (holding that case record supported finding that
Napster had actual knowledge that specific infringing material was available using its
system, that it could have blocked access to the system of suppliers of infringing material,
and that it failed to remove that material); see also Graves, supra note 118, at 148 (noting
that Napster court required that knowledge be linked to demonstrated infringing use of
Napster).
136 See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster I), 380 F.3d 1154, 1162 (9th
Cir. 2004) (emphasizing the standard in the Ninth Circuit to shield a defendant from
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further that actual knowledge of direct infringement occurring at
a time when the defendant was not materially contributing to
such activity will not constitute contributory infringement.137
At trial, Plaintiffs demonstrated that the Defendants did have
knowledge that their users had previously been engaging in, and
continued to engage in, illegal infringing activity.138 However,
Grokster and StreamCast were also utilized by the software
users to exchange public domain and authorized sound files, text
files, software applications, and digital images, and were
therefore deemed to be capable of substantial non-infringing
uses. 139 Following Napster, plaintiffs were therefore subject to a
heightened knowledge requirement and had to demonstrate that
at the time of the alleged material contribution to the
infringement, the defendants had specific knowledge of its
occurrence. 140 Although the Defendants could have demonstrated
that they did not have specific knowledge of the direct
infringement at the time such infringement occurred, it was not
liability); see also Graves, supra note 118, at 149 (noting that Napster court appeared to
offer only heightened knowledge requirement in contributory copyright infringement
when infringing article of commerce is capable of substantial non-infringing uses).
137 See Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1157, 1163 (holding that Grokster and StreamCast
did not materially contribute to their users' infringement because "the Software
Distributors have not provided the site and facilities for infringement in the first place.");
see also Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159,
1163 (2d Cir. 1971) (finding that contributory infringer had actual knowledge that artists
it was managing were performing copyrighted works, was capable of policing artists'
infringing conduct, and also derived substantial benefit from primary infringers' actions).
138 See Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1157-58 (2004) (stating that Grokster and
StreamCast freely distributed software that allowed users to share computer files with
each other, including digitized music and motion pictures); see also Matthew J. Rust,
Casenote, Nobody Uses Betamax Anymore and Neither Should the Supreme Court: Why
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. Should be Overturned, 28 HAMLINE
L. REV. 549, 553 (2005) (discussing how Software Distributors had knowledge that
software users used their product to infringe copyrights).
139 See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster 1), 259 F.Supp.2d 1029, 1035-
36 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (determining that plaintiffs do not dispute that defendant's software is
being utilized and could be utilized for substantial noninfringing uses); see also Rust,
supra note 138, at 556 (noting that it was "the users of the software that provided access
and created the network on which the infringing activity occurred, not the Software
Distributors" and therefore did not have knowledge of infringing activity).
140 See Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1162 (arguing that "[tihe Copyright Owners were
required to establish that the Software Distributors had 'specific knowledge of
infringement at a time at which they contribute[d] to the infringement, and ... fail[ed] to
act upon that information") (citation omitted); see also Rust, supra note 138, at 555
(commenting that "the Copyright Owners were forced to show that the Software
Distributors had reasonable knowledge of specific infringing files and failed to act on that
knowledge to prevent infringement").
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necessary as the court ultimately found that there was no
material contribution at all.141
The court further used the Napster decision to determine
whether the plaintiffs had satisfied the material contribution
requirement of the contributory liability cause of action. 142 The
Ninth Circuit asserted material contribution as offering the "site
and facilities for infringement, followed by a failure to stop
specific instances of infringement once knowledge of those
infringements is acquired."143 The court carefully reviewed the
manner by which the Grokster and StreamCast programs were
designed and maintained, taking into consideration the
structural elements outlined in Part II(b) of this article. Based
on the Grokster and StreamCast structures, which were absent a
centralized server, maintained no control over the user networks,
and had no information regarding specific file transfers between
users, the court found that the Software Distributors did not
materially contribute to any direct infringement.144 Although
plaintiffs stressed that Grokster did in fact maintain an "ongoing
relationship" 145 with its users because Grokster preserved a
connection to the users' computers in order to transmit
advertisements, the court viewed the distribution of software,
141 See Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1163 (stating that "[w]e also agree with the district
court that with respect to their current software distribution and related activities,
defendants do not materially contribute to copyright infringement"); see also Rust, supra
note 138, at 553 (specifying that "the Software Distributors had knowledge that many
users of their software used it to infringe copyrights, but found that the Software
Distributors did not make a material contribution to the infringement, and therefore held
the Software Distributors were not liable for contributory infringement").
142 See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster I), 380 F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th
Cir. 2004) (clarifying that "In Napster I, we found material contribution after reciting the
district court's factual finding that 'Napster is an integrated service"'); see also Rust,
supra note 138, at 555 (explaining that "[tihe court followed the analysis it developed in
Napster and applied the Sony doctrine to the knowledge requirement of contributory
infringement").
143 Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1157, 1163.
144 Id. at 1164 (announcing that "[ajll of these activities are too incidental to any
direct copy-right infringement to constitute material contribution"); see also Rust, supra
note 138, at 556 (noting that "the Software Distributors did not make a material
contribution to the infringement, and therefore held the Software Distributors were not
liable for contributory infringement").
145 The Sony court required an "ongoing relationship" between the direct infringer
and the contributory infringer in order to make a finding of contributory copyright
infringement. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 437 (1984). It
is apparent that the Ninth Circuit did not regard the mere transmittal of advertisements
to be an "ongoing relationship." See Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1164.
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which allowed users to infringe, very differently from the
facilitation of infringement. 146
ii. Vicarious Liability
The Ninth Circuit analyzed the claim of vicarious liability in a
typical fashion by requiring both a financial benefit gained from
the direct infringement and the right and ability to supervise the
infringing activity.147 Although neither Grokster nor StreamCast
received payment for the use of their programs, both companies
derived a financial benefit through advertising proceeds, thereby
satisfying the first element.148 The plaintiffs further asserted
that the Software Distributors had certain measures readily
accessible to reduce direct copyright infringement, including
filters that would screen out copyrighted song titles and digital
watermarking that would identify and block copyrighted
works.149 Yet the Ninth Circuit rejected this argument by
concluding that the ability to change the underlying architecture
of the peer-to-peer file sharing software did not amount to the
"ability to supervise" the direct infringement of its users. 150 The
146 See Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1162 (positing that defendants did nothing to
facilitate and could not stop infringement because users have access to infringing files);
see also Graves, supra note 118, at 154 (highlighting that "the Grokster court viewed
distribution of software that merely allows users to infringe very differently from
facilitating infringement at the time of the infringement").
147 See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster 1), 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1043
(C.D. Cal. 2003) (stating that "[tihe doctrine of vicarious infringement, an expansion of
traditional respondeat superior, extends liability for copyright infringement to 'cases in
which a defendant 'has a right and ability to supervise the infringing activity and also has
a direct financial interest in such activities'"') (citation omitted); see also Rust, supra note
138, at 559 (noting that vicarious liability is found where party has rights and abilities to
supervise infringing activity and also has direct financial interest in such activities).
148 See Grokster I, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1044 (suggesting that StreamCast and Grokster
derive substantial revenue from advertising proceeds); see also Rust, supra note 138, at
554 n.27 (proposing that "[t]he Software Distributors generated revenue through
advertising, not from selling their software") (citation omitted).
149 See Grokster I, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1045 (explaining that "Plaintiffs note that
Defendants' software already includes optional screens for pornographic/obscene file
names, and that it could just as easily screen out copyrighted song titles"); see also Rust,
supra note 138, at 554 n.28 (stating that "the copyright holders noted that filters were
already in place for certain types of files and could easily be added to screen out
copyrighted files") (citation omitted).
150 See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster I1), 380 F.3d 1154, 1165-66
(9th Cir. 2004) (holding that owners' evidence of right and ability to supervise file sharing
copyrighted files did not amount to "ability to supervise" direct infringement of individual
users); see also Rust, supra note 138, at 556-57 (concluding that "[tihe court further
rejected the copyright owners' argument that the Software Distributors' ability to alter
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court explained that mandating software modifications might be
a remedy for vicarious copyright infringement liability, but not a
way to establish such a claim in the first place.151 The court
therefore found that neither company was vicariously liable for
the copyright infringement of its users. 152
D. The Supreme Court of the United States Reverses The Ninth
Circuit
In June 2005, Justice Souter delivered the unanimous opinion
of the United States Supreme Court.153 The Court considered the
circumstances under which the distributor of a product that is
capable of both lawful and unlawful use is liable for acts of
copyright infringement by the third parties using that product.154
In reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Court held that "one who
distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to
infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other
affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the
resulting acts of infringement by third parties."155
the software to prevent swapping of copyrighted files amounted to the right and ability to
supervise necessary to impose vicarious liability") (footnote omitted).
151 See Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1165-66 (finding that "the Copyright Owners confuse
the right and ability to supervise with the strong duty imposed on entities that have
already been determined to be liable for vicarious copyright infringement"); see also Rust,
supra note 138, at 557 (discussing that "[tihe court distinguished these two types of
abilities by pointing out that the duty to police unauthorized activity is a penalty imposed
on entities that have already been found vicariously liable for copyright infringement").
152 See Grokster II, 380 F.3d at 1165-66 (suggesting that "[w]e agree with the district
court that possibilities for upgrading software located on another person's computer are
irrelevant to determining whether vicarious liability exists") (citation omitted); see also
Rust, supra note 138, at 557 (commenting that "[t]he court therefore upheld the district
court's grant of summary judgment for the Software Distributors on the issue of vicarious
liability") (footnote omitted).
153 See MGM Studios, Inc., v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster III), 125 S.Ct. 2764, 2770
(2005) (noting that Justice Souter delivered Court's opinion); see also Timothy K.
Andrews, Note & Comment: Control Content, Not Innovation: Why Hollywood Should
Embrace Peer-to-Peer Technology Despite the MGM v. Grokster Battle, 25 LOY. L.A. ENT.
L. REV. 383, 422 (stating that "[o]n June 27, 2005, in a unanimous 9-0 decision, the
Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and ruled that defendants Grokster and
StreamCast could be liable for inducing copyright infringement").
154 See Grokster IIl, 125 S.Ct. at 2770 (announcing that "Respondents, Grokster, Ltd.,
and StreamCast Networks, Inc., defendants in the trial court, distribute free software
products that allow computer users to share electronic files through peer-to-peer
networks, so called because users' computers communicate directly with each other, not
through central servers"); see also Andrews, supra note 153, at 422 (determining that
"[the unanimous Supreme Court majority shows an adept understanding of peer-to-peer
technology and the competing interests of copyright and innovation").
155 Grokster III, 125 S.Ct. at 2770.
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The Court began its analysis by noting the existing tension
between the parties' warring value systems - the support of
creative pursuits through copyright protection and the promotion
of innovation in new communication technologies by limiting the
liability of copyright infringement.156 The more that artistic
protection is favored, the more that technological advancements
may be discouraged: "the administration of copyright law is an
exercise in managing the trade-off."157 The Court recognized that
this tension lies at the heart of the Grokster case; the claim being
that the digital distribution of copyrighted material endangered
copyright holders more than ever because "every copy is identical
to the original, copying is easy, and many people (especially the
young) use file-sharing software to download copyrighted
works."158 These concerns are offset by the notion that imposing
liability, not only on the direct infringers but also on the software
distributors, could limit future innovations of beneficial
technologies.159 The Court added, however, that the argument
made in favor of imposing indirect liability was strong in light of
the high number of infringing downloads that occur every day
with the use of the defendants' software.160 "When a widely
shared service or product is used to commit infringement, it may
be impossible to enforce rights in the protected work effectively
against all direct infringers, the only practical alternative being
to go against the distributor of the copying device for secondary
liability on a theory of contributory or vicarious infringement."161
i. Analysis of the Sony Doctrine
Since the parties rely on the arguments and authority set forth
in Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios162 in support of their
156 Id. at 2775 (noting respective values of supporting creative pursuits and
promoting innovation in communication technology).
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 MGM Studios, Inc., v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster III), 125 S.Ct. 2764, 2775 (2005)
(highlighting concern that imposing liability on distributors of software could limit
development of technology).
160 Id. at 2776 (commenting on number of downloads that occur everyday using
StreamCast's and Grokster's software).
161 Id. In re Aimster Copyright Litigation (Aimster I1), 334 F.3d 643, 645-46 (7th Cir.
2003) (explaining that due to the impracticability of suing a large number of individual
infringers, the law lets a copyright holder sue a contributor to the infringement).
162 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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positions on the issue of contributory infringement, the Court
recognized the need for the consideration of such principles
originally stated in Sony. 163 In Sony, the Court stated, "the lines
between direct infringement, contributory infringement and
vicarious liability are not clearly drawn."164 The Court recounted
the facts of Sony and noted that because there was no evidence of
stated or implied intent to encourage infringing uses, the only
possible basis for imposing liability was on a theory of
contributory infringement stemming from the sale of VCRs to
consumers with knowledge that some of those users would use
the VCRs to infringe.165 The Court in Sony determined, however,
that since the VCR was "capable of commercially significant non-
infringing uses," the manufacturer could not be held liable solely
on the basis of the product's distribution.166
The Court noted that the Sony analysis followed the traditional
staple-article of commerce theory and patent law, since codified,
in that the distribution of a component of a patented product will
not violate the patent if it is capable of other non-infringing
uses. 167 The Court explained this theory to mean that "where an
article is 'good for nothing else' but infringement, there is no
legitimate public interest in its unlicensed availability, and there
is no injustice in presuming or imputing an intent to infringe."16s
On the other hand, the doctrine protects the same action of
selling a product with lawful and unlawful uses by limiting the
liability imposed in instances where there is only the simple
understanding that a portion of one's products will be used in an
163 Grokster IIl, 125 S.Ct. at 2776 (explaining the need to examine the Sony holding
as the copyright holders tailored their claim to the Court's opinion in that case).
164 Sony, 464 U.S. at 435, n.17.
165 MGM Studios, Inc., v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster I), 125 S.Ct. 2764, 2777 (2005)
(explaining that in the Sony case the only possible basis for holding manufacturer liable
was the theory of contributory infringement).
166 Id. (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 442).
167 Id. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (stating that "[w]hoever offers to sell or sells within the
United States... a patented machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a
material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process... knowing the same to be
especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a
staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall
be liable as a contributory infringer"); see also Greg E. Upchurch and Roland L. Trope,
"Staple Article:" In Defense of Betamax and Its Progeny, 60 BUS. LAW. 417, 419 (2004)
(noting that as a result of Sony, the issue of contributory copyright infringement usually
depends on whether the article is a staple article of commerce and the technology is
capable of substantial non-infringing uses).
168 Grokster III, 125 S.Ct. at 2777.
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infringing manner.169 As such, the staple article of commerce
doctrine "leaves breathing room for innovation and vigorous
commerce."170
The Plaintiffs argued that by granting summary judgment to
the Defendants as to their current activities, the Ninth Circuit
gave too much weight to the value of innovation and new
technologies and not enough weight to the copyrights that were
infringed upon by the activities of the Defendants, in that 90% of
the works made available on one of the networks were under
copyright.171 The Plaintiffs also contended that the remaining
10% should not qualify as "substantial" non-infringing uses and
that the Court should clarify the standard, in that a product used
"principally" for infringement should not qualify for protection.172
In response, Defendants offered evidence indicating that the
software may be used to reproduce public domain works, there
are copyright holders who encourage the use of such software,
and that the non-infringing uses are significant and will grow
over time. 173
The Court agreed with the Plaintiffs' argument that the Ninth
Circuit misapplied the Sony doctrine by reading it to limit
secondary liability beyond the circumstances to which the case
169 MGM Studios, Inc., v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster I11), 125 S.Ct. 2764, 2777-78
(2005). See RAYMOND T. NIMMER, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT & CYBERSPACE § 4:44.3 (2005)
(explaining that Supreme Court's holding in Grokster was motivated by common law
concept of inducement which requires actual and affirmative steps to promote
infringement).
170 Grokster III, 125 S.Ct. at 2778. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 442 (explaining balance
must be struck between copyright holder's need for protection and the rights of others to
freely engage in areas of commerce); Dawson Chemical Co. v. Robin & Haas Co., 448 U.S.
176, 221 (1980) (noting Congress chose to compromise between the competing interests of
free competition versus stimulating invention); Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 48
(1912), overruled by Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502
(1917) (discussing the fact that selling article that is adapted to both infringing uses and
lawful uses is not enough to make seller a contributory infringer).
171 Grokster III, 125 S.Ct. at 2778 (explaining the argument by copyright holders that
since 90% of works available on networks was copyrighted, granting summary judgment
to the networks put too much value on innovative technology).
172 Id. See Brief of Petitioner at 31, Grokster III, 125 S.Ct. 2764, No. 04-480 (Jan. 24,
2005) (arguing that staple article of commerce defense should not be available when
primary use of a product or service is infringing).
173 Grokster III, 125 S.Ct. at 2778. See Brief of Respondent at 21, Grokster III, 125,
S.Ct. 2764, No. 04-480 (March 1, 2005) (noting district court's finding that the software is
regularly used to facilitate and search for public domain materials, government
documents, and authorized media content).
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applied.174 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit read the doctrine to
mean that whenever a product is capable of substantial non-
infringing uses, the manufacturer can never be held secondarily
liable for the unlawful actions of its customers, the direct
infringers.175 Since this interpretation is overly broad, the
limitations on liability would apply in situations even when "an
actual purpose to cause infringing use is shown by evidence
independent of design and distribution of the product, unless the
distributors had 'specific knowledge of infringement at a time at
which they contributed to the infringement, and failed to act
upon that information.""176 As such, the Ninth Circuit felt
justified in refraining from imposing liability on the Software
Distributors in this case because there was no showing that their
software, created without a central server, gave them knowledge
of specific unlawful uses. 177
The Court concluded that this interpretation was made in error
because it in essence converted the case from one about liability
based on imputed intent to one about liability based on any
theory.178 It noted that nothing in Sony mandated a court to
ignore evidence of intent if such evidence is present, and further
that the case was not meant to foreclose common law rules of
fault based liability.179 "Thus, where evidence goes beyond a
product's characteristics or the knowledge that it may be put to
infringing uses, and shows statements or actions directed to
promoting infringement, Sony's staple-article rule will not
preclude liability."180 After making this determination, the Court
decided that it was not necessary to reconsider Sony any further
and refused to add a more calculated explanation of the balance
that lies between protection and innovation when liability is
174 MGM Studios, Inc., v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster Il), 125 S.Ct. 2764, 2778 (2005)
(stating that Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit misapplied Sony doctrine).
175 Id. (noting opinion of Ninth Circuit unnecessarily limited secondary liability).
176 Id. (citing MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster fl), 380 F.3d 1154, 1162-
63 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that producer would not be liable under any circumstances
when his product also serves a substantial legal use according to the Ninth Circuit's
application of the Sony doctrine)).
177 Id. (discussing the holding in the Ninth Circuit opinion).
178 Id. (describing Ninth Circuit's error in reasoning).
179 Id. at 2779 (elaborating on Ninth Circuit's misapplication of Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)).
180 MGM Studios, Inc., v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster I1), 125 S.Ct. 2764, 2779 (2005)
(clarifying the extent of rule found in Sony).
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founded solely upon distribution with knowledge that unlawful
use will occur.18 1 "It is enough to note that the Ninth Circuit's
judgment rested on an erroneous understanding of Sony and to
leave further consideration of the Sony rule for a day when that
may be required."182
ii. Application of the Inducement Theory
The Supreme Court was not compelled to further discuss the
Sony doctrine in this case in large part because it decided that
the Ninth Circuit had erred in granting summary judgment on
the Copyright Holders' claim of inducement. 8 3 "The classic case
of direct evidence of unlawful purpose occurs when one induces
commission of infringement by another, or 'entices or persuades
another' to infringe,18 4 as by advertising."185 As such, at common
law, a defendant in a copyright or patent law case who "not only
expected but invoked [infringing use] by advertisement" was
liable for infringement "on principles recognized in every part of
the law."186 The law is the same today; evidence that active steps
have been taken to promote direct infringement, by advertising
an infringing product or demonstrating how to infringe, for
example, coupled with a showing that the infringement was
encouraged, will demonstrate an affirmative intent that the
product be used to infringe and will overcome the law's hesitation
to find a defendant who sells a product capable of non-infringing
uses liable.18 7 The Court in this case adopted the inducement
181 Id. at 2778 (limiting Sony's application in present case).
182 Id. at 2778-79.
183 Id. at 2779 (commenting that where evidence of intent is shown, nothing in Sony
obligates courts to ignore such evidence).
184 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 781 (6th ed. 1990) (defining infringement as
"[u]nauthorized use of copyrighted material; i.e. use without permission of a copyright
holder").
185 Grokster III, 125 S.Ct. at 2779 (describing situation where infringement occurs).
186 Id. (describing infringement by advertisement at common law). See Kalem Co. v.
Harper Brothers, 222 U.S. 55, 62-63 (1911) (holding that defendant infringed on
copyright of author by creating film based on book); see also Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224
U.S. 1, 48-49 (1911) (holding that defendants committed contributory infringement),
overruled by Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
187 Grokster III, 125 S.Ct. at 2779 (noting that rule of inducement of infringement is
indistinguishable from that found in early cases). See Oak Industries, Inc. v. Zenith
Electronics Corp., 697 F. Supp. 988, 992 (ND Ill. 1988) (discussing contributory
infringement and inducement of infringement); see also Water Technologies Corp. v.
Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (describing inducement of infringement);
Fromberg, Inc. v. Thornhill, 315 F.2d 407, 412-13 (5th Cir. 1963) (holding defendants
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theory, as it had adopted patent law's staple-article theory as a
model for its copyright safe-harbor rule in Sony.188 As such, it
held that "one who distributes a devise with the object of
promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear
expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster
infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by
third parties."189 Mindful of the holding's potential for inhibiting
future innovations and new technologies, the Court was careful
to note that mere knowledge of infringing capabilities or of actual
infringing activities is not enough to subject the manufacturer or
distributor to liability.190 Instead, the rule of inducement imposes
liability only where "purposeful, culpable expression and
conduct" are evident and, as such, would not inhibit future
innovations or commerce with a lawful function. 191
Utilizing the inducement theory, the Plaintiffs would have to
demonstrate that the Defendants communicated an inducing
message to the software users in order to overcome summary
judgment.192 As mentioned earlier, the traditional form of
inducement is an advertisement or solicitation that depicts a
message created to encourage others to commit violations.193 In
this case, it is undisputed that StreamCast emitted
advertisements on the computer screens of users of Napster-
compatible programs which urged the acceptance of the
"OpenNap" program, designed to provide services similar to those
offered by Napster.194 Grokster provided an electronic newsletter
liable for inducing infringement); Sims v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 1198, 1215
(E.D. Pa. 1978) (holding defendant guilty of inducement by infringing on patent), vacated,
608 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1979).
188 MGM Studios, Inc., v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster II1), 125 S.Ct. 2764, 2780 (2005)
(stating that inducement rule is appropriate for copyright); see also Sony Corp. of America
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (holding that defendants did not
commit copyright infringement by selling home videotape recorders).
189 Grokster III, 125 S.Ct. at 2780 (adopting the inducement rule).
190 Id. (stating that distributor is similarly not automatically subject to liability when
engaging in acts related to product distribution including offering product updates).
191 Id. (showing requirements necessary to impose liability).
192 Id. (applying inducement rule to present case).
193 Id. (noting MGM's claim of such a message by StreamCast and Grokster).
194 The program was designed to lure patrons of Napster and those who accepted the
invitation were offered software that performed the same services as Napster. The Court
noted that a factfinder could conclude that these services included the ability to download
copyrighted music files. Grokster III, 125 S.Ct. at 2780. Grokster and Streamcast targeted
Napster users by beaming ads onto the screens of these users urging them to use the
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containing links to articles that promoted its software's ability to
download copyrighted music. 19 5 Additionally, the Court noted
that both companies conveyed a clear message by affirmatively
responding to questions seeking help in retrieving and playing
copyrighted materials.1 96
Further, the Court pointed out the fact that the record
contained other evidence which tended to show that the
Defendants acted with the purpose of causing copyright
violations by its software's users. 197 The Court noted three
specific features of this evidence. 198 First, both companies
portrayed themselves to be satisfying a known source of demand
for copyright infringement, former Napster users. 199 Second,
neither company attempted to implement or design filtering tools
or other instruments to decrease the unlawful activity. 200 The
Court explicitly disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's determination
that the Defendants were under no obligation to create or utilize
such tools, as such behavior, or lack there of, "underscores
Grokster's and StreamCast's intentional facilitation of their
users' infringement."2 1 Third, the Court acknowledged that the
Defendants earn money through advertising; the more the
software is used, the more the advertisements are distributed,
OpenNap program. See David Post, The Impact of 'Grokster,'27 NAT'L L. J., Aug. 3, 2005,
at 10.
195 The Court equated both the Napster and Grokster programs in stating that
[A]nyone whose Napster or free file-sharing searches turned up a link to Grokster
would have understood Grokster to be offering the same file-sharing ability as
Napster, and to the same people who probably used Napster for infringing downloads;
that would also have been the understanding of anyone offered Grokster's
suggestively named Swaptor software, its version of OpenNap.
MGM Studios, Inc., v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster II1), 125 S.Ct. 2764, 2780-81 (2005).
Grokster distributed an electronic newsletter which promoted its software's ability to
access copyrighted music, and that the name "Grokster" was derived from "Napster." See
Michael R. Graif, A Bow to Innovation: The Supreme Court's Decision in MGM v.
Grokster, PAT. STRATEGY & MGMT., August 2005, at 1.
196 Grokster III, 125 S. Ct. at 2781 (stating that Grokster and Napster both helped
users locate and play copyrighted materials).
197 Id. (discussing how summary judgment record is replete with such additional
evidence).
198 Id. (stating that these aspects are "particularly notable").
199 Id. (explaining how both companies targeted former Napster users); see Post,
supra note 194, at 10 (noting that both companies aimed to satisfy source of known
copyright infringement demand, former Napster users).
200 Grokster III, 125 S. Ct. at 2781 (noting the absence of filtering tools to decrease
the extent of unlawful infringement).
201 Id.
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and the more money the companies receive. 202 "Since the extent
of the software's use determines the gain to the distributors, the
commercial sense of their enterprise turns on high-volume use,
which the record shows is infringing."203 The Court noted that
while this piece of evidence alone would not be sufficient to
sustain an inference of unlawful intent, taken as a whole its
implications are clear.204 In rejecting an argument set forth by
the Defendants, the Court explained that the basis for potential
liability is not only that promoting a user to infringe a copyright
can give rise to secondary liability, but instead that the
distribution of a product can in it of itself give rise to liability in
instances where the evidence demonstrates that the distributor
intended and encouraged the product to be used in an infringing
manner.205
The inducement theory also requires evidence of actual
infringement by the software users.206 The Court noted that in
this case there was evidence of infringement on a large scale,
though the exact calculation of unlawful use was in dispute. 207
Ultimately, it determined that the summary judgment evidence
was at the very least adequate to allow the Plaintiffs to proceed
with claims for damages and equitable relief 208
The Supreme Court concluded by determining that the present
case is significantly different from Sony and reliance on same to
rule in favor of the Defendants was error.209 The evidence
presented in this case addresses a different basis of liability
which is supported by the Defendants' actions and words which
show a purpose to cause and profit from third party acts of
202 MGM Studios, Inc., v. Grokster, Ltd. (Grokster 111), 125 S.Ct. 2764, 2782 (2005)
(explaining that higher use of software results in higher volume of advertisements sent
out, which increases the advertising revenue).
203 Id.
204 Id. (noting that viewed in entire context, import of evidence is unclear).
205 Id. (explaining that in such case, culpable act is not only encouraging
infringement but also distributing the tool intended for infringing uses).
206 Id. (stating that in addition to intent to infringe and distribution of infringing
tools, inducement theory requires evidence of actual infringement by recipients).
207 Id. (noting there was infringement on a "gigantic scale").
208 Id. (stating that summary judgment evidence was sufficient to allow MGM to go
forward with its claims).
209 Id. (finding that this case differed substantially from Sony and that the Ninth
Circuit should not have relied on Sony to decide this case).
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copyright infringement.210 The Court further stated that there
was "substantial evidence in MGM's favor on all elements of
inducement, and summary judgment in favor of Grokster and
StreamCast was error."211 The Court ultimately called for a
reconsideration of the Copyright Holder's motion for summary
judgment on remand. 212
III. THE FUTURE OF PEER-TO-PEER FILE SHARING
The Supreme Court's decision in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v.
Grokster, Ltd. will undoubtedly have a momentous effect on both
the Software Distributors and the Copyright Owners because the
stakes in this case are so high.213 Andrew Lack, the Chairman of
Sony BMG Music Entertainment, has summarized the
implications of Grokster in the following excerpt, "I think this
court's decision is a game changer. It will dramatically affect
behavior, and behavior will dramatically affect how music is sold
and distributed and consumed. It will clarify the law and
establish right from wrong."2 14
Four months after the Supreme Court's decision, Grokster
entered into a settlement agreement with the Copyright
Owners. 215 Under the terms of the agreement, Grokster was
required to immediately discontinue supporting its file-sharing
network and Grokster's owners agreed to pay a total of $50
million in damages to the movie studios, record labels and music
210 Id. (noting MGM's evidence addresses a different basis of liability for distributing
products open to alternative uses).
211 Id.
212 Id. (holding that judgment of Court of Appeals is vacated and case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion).
213 Julie Hilden, File Sharing Goes Before Supreme Court (2005), available at
www.cnn.com2005/LAW/02/16/hilden.fileswap/index.html (hereinafter "Hilden")
(explaining the immense damages that will likely befall the software distributors); see
also Jeffrey L. Dodes, Beyond Napster, Beyond the United States: The Technological and
International Legal Barriers to Online Copyright Enforcement, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 279,
316 (2003) (explaining that "[t]he industry will have to grapple with these major issues
and the public will have to be patient").
214 See Saul Hansell and Jeff Leeds, A Supreme Court Showdown for File Sharing,
N.Y. TIMES, March 28, 2005, at A2 (noting that industry executives believe that Supreme
Court's Grokster decision will significantly change behavior of software providers vis-a-vis
the music industry).





producers. 216 Mitch Bainwol, CEO of the Recording Industry
Association of America, issued the following statement: "This
settlement brings to a close an incredibly significant chapter in
the story of digital music. This is a chapter that ends on a high
note for the recording industry, the tech community and music
fans and consumers everywhere." 217
Although the settlement agreement indicates that the four-
year legal battle between the Copyright Owners and the
Software Distributors has come to an end, the war wages on.218
Grokster's co-defendant, StreamCast Networks, continues to
operate its peer-to-peer file sharing network and has previously
stated that it would pursue the case in lower courts.219 Despite
StreamCast's persistence, however, the Supreme Court's decision
has had a significant impact on the file-sharing industry.220 The
distributors of WinMX, a peer-to-peer file sharing program that
runs on the Microsoft Windows operating system, removed their
product from the Internet a few months following the decision. 221
Mark Gorton, the CEO of the brokerage firm that produces
LimeWire, a file sharing alternative to Grokster, stated that he
would likely cease the distribution of LimeWire in reaction to the
Court's ruling since it appeared too difficult to satisfy the implied
standard for inducement. 222 "Some people are saying that as
long as I don't actively induce infringement, I'm O.K.," he
said. "I don't think it will work out that way. '223 Meta Machine,
the company that distributes eDonkey, one of the most popular
file-sharing programs, stated that it hopes to reach a settlement




2 1 9 Id.
220 Id.
221 Id.; see also Richard Menta, WinmX Shut Down, available at
http://www.mp3newswire.
net/stories/5002/winmxdown.html.
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licensed, industry-approved service. 224 It seems that Grokster is
headed in this direction, as well. Michael Page, an attorney
speaking on behalf of Grokster, stated, "The brand will live on. It
is shut down, but we look forward to launching a licensed, legal
new version of Grokster. 225
Some believe that the Supreme Court's decision may help
define the terms of a "cease-fire." 226 An end to litigation might
revive negotiations between certain music labels and some file
sharing companies to find ways for users to share some files for
free and others for a charge. 227 For example, some executives
have contemplated a plan in which users could download free,
low quality tracks with a promise to buy "higher quality
versions" in the future. 228 In fact, two of the biggest music
companies, Universal Music Group and Sony BMG, recently
signed a deal to offer music through Snocap, a software package
designed to control the sharing of unauthorized music. 229
Designed by Shawn Fanning, the original founder of Napster, the
program identifies music files being shared through file sharing
networks and then attaches a price to them. 230 In addition to
Universal and Sony, Snocap will also be utilized by Mashboxx, a
new, legal file-sharing program supported by the record labels
224 See Borland, supra note 215.
225 Id.
226 See Hansell, supra note 214; see also Richard Swope, Peer-To-Peer File Sharing
and Copyright Infringement: A Danger Ahead for Individuals Sharing Files on the
Internet, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 861, 896 (stating that "[u]nfortunately for patrons of
P2P file-sharing networks, under current statutory and case law there is no "safe harbor"
for those users wishing to download or share copyrighted material without an express
license or authorization from the copyright owner").
227 See Hansell, supra note 214 (noting that some independent labels are trying to
sell their music on file-sharing networks); see also Swope, supra note 226, at 896
(explaining the possible scenarios that file-sharers may encounter in the future).
228 See Hansell, supra note 214; see also Swope, supra note 226, at 895 (explaining
potential options to file sharers through the "fair-use" exception).
229 See Hansell, supra note 214; see also Swope, supra note 226, at 895.
230 See John Borland and Stefanie Olsen, Napster's Fanning Has Snocap-ped Vision
(Jan. 26, 2004), CNET NEWS.COM, available at
http://news.com.com/Napsters+Fanning+has+Snocap-ped+vision2100-1025_3-
5147386.html. Snocap claims to be the first music licensing platform. Essentially the
program utilizes Napster's centralized peer-to-peer structure, without the peer-to-peer
client. The centralized server acts as a licensing manager by ensuring that only licensed
content is shared or downloaded and noting which tracks are copied for royalty purposes.
See Tony Smith, Shawn Fanning's Snocap Touts Vision of P2P Heaven, (Dec. 3, 2004),
THE REGISTER, available at www.theregister.co.uk/2004/12/03/snocaplaunch/ (relating a
system of how licensed content can be shared with a royalty fee included).
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and initiated by Wayne Russo, the former president of
Grokster.231 A source close to the Grokster company indicated
that the file-sharing network's assets would be acquired by
Mashboxx and that the new Grokster will in essence be a re-
branded version of the Mashboxx service. 232
Although Snocap may be the future, or at least an indication of
the future, of peer - to - peer file sharing, it will face some
significant challenges. The company has not yet released an
effective version of the program and many advocates of file-
sharing have dismissed the idea as unworkable. 233 Michael
Weiss, chief executive of StreamCast networks stated, "Snocap
will fail miserably in the market. If I was looking for a download,
and I got some sort of truncated file with a message that says
buy this or do that, I don't see why anybody would embrace that.
If you wanted to buy music, you could go to the online stores that
are doing a great job like iTunes."234 Mr. Russo countered by
saying, "There are 2.5 billion music files traded every month... If
we can capture 1 percent of that, 25 million files, and we convert
5 to 10 percent of those to paid, I am very happy."235 Regardless
of the successes or failures of these new ventures, one thing is
certain; the tug-of-war between software developers and
copyright owners will not yield any clear winners in the
foreseeable future.
CONCLUSION
MGM v. Grokster will be a landmark case in the realm of peer-
to-peer file sharing. Not only are the stakes high for the parties
involved, but the court's ruling will also affect individual network
users, software distributors of all types and copyright owners in
the music and movie industries. Through the use of file sharing
software, 2.6 billion music files are downloaded each month, and
231 See Hansell, supra note 214 (noting that Snocap also has "endorsements" from
Universal and Sony BMG).
232 See supra note 215.




STJOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
one-half of a million movies are downloaded every day.23 6
Regardless of the outcome of this case, one thing is certain, new
software and Internet technologies will continue to push the
envelope of freedom of information, and profit-driven copyright
owners will continue to fight back. Until now, the lower courts
have relied in large part on the original holding in Sony to
determine copyright infringement liability. The fast-paced
growth of Internet technologies and several ambiguous court
decisions have demonstrated the need for a more applicable,
more modern rule. The Supreme Court had before it the
opportunity to set forth that rule, yet it refused to do so. Instead,
the Court determined that the Sony doctrine was inapplicable in
the present case and reserved judgment for another time. Its
ruling, however, demonstrates the Court's disdain for the
encouragement and promotion of copyright infringement and
made clear that it would not tolerate a distributor's inducement
of unlawful activity.
236 See Erroll Louis, Music Moguls on Wrong Side of Copyright Fight, DAILY NEWS,
Apr. 1, 2005, at 43 (explaining popularity of music downloading); see also Swope, supra
note 226, at 863 (stating that "P2P file sharing consumes as much as seventy percent of
overall Internet bandwidth").
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